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UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS 
FOR THE THIRD CIRCUIT 
___________ 
 
No. 15-3264 
___________ 
 
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA 
 
v.  
 
HO-MAN LEE, 
   Appellant 
____________________________________ 
 
On Appeal from the United States District Court 
for the District of New Jersey 
(D.C. Civil Action No. 2-13-cr-00029-001) 
District Judge:  Hon. Kevin McNulty 
____________________________________ 
 
Submitted Under Third Circuit LAR 34.1(a) 
on Tuesday, June 7, 2016 
 
Before: CHAGARES, KRAUSE and SCIRICA, Circuit Judges 
 
(Opinion filed:  November 3, 2016) 
 
   
 
OPINION* 
  
                                              
 * This disposition is not an opinion of the full Court and pursuant to I.O.P. 5.7 
does not constitute binding precedent. 
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KRAUSE, Circuit Judge. 
 Ho-Man Lee was arrested and charged with one count of conspiracy to unlawfully 
produce driver’s licenses and three counts of unlawfully producing such identification 
documents.  He pleaded guilty to the conspiracy charge and, over a year later, filed a 
motion to withdraw his guilty plea.  The District Court denied that motion, and Lee now 
appeals that decision.  For the reasons set forth below, we will affirm. 
I. Background 
 Because we write primarily for the parties, we provide background only as 
relevant to the issues on appeal.  Lee is a native of South Korea, who was admitted to the 
United States as a Lawful Permanent Resident in the late 1990s.  In 2007, he met a man 
named Han Chul Na.  They became friends, and, according to Lee, in 2008, Na requested 
Lee’s assistance in procuring information on criminal activity in the Korean community.  
Per Lee, Na indicated he was a part-time agent for the United States Immigration and 
Customs Enforcement Office (ICE) and claimed he needed a “big case” to have his 
contract renewed and to obtain full-time employment with ICE.  App. 7, 108.  Lee 
maintains that Na showed him a badge, handcuffs, and a business card listing Na as 
“Director” of Homeland Security.  App. 7.  Lee agreed to help and began providing 
information on a number of criminal organizations, including ones involved in financial 
fraud, illegal gambling, and prostitution.   
 According to Lee, in 2011, Na instructed him to infiltrate a document-fraud 
conspiracy administered by a man named Oscar Park, in which capacity Lee assisted Park 
in fraudulently obtaining driver’s licenses using forged documentation.  Lee received 
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$500 for each issued license, which he claims to have donated to a scholarship.  At some 
point in 2012, Lee left Park’s enterprise and began an operation with Na that, like Park’s 
organization, helped undocumented aliens fraudulently obtain driver’s licenses.   
 On June 27, 2012, Lee was arrested for his role in Park’s document-fraud 
conspiracy.  On January 7, 2014, a week before trial was scheduled, Lee pleaded guilty.  
One year later, he filed a motion to withdraw his guilty plea, arguing that he lacked the 
necessary mental state to commit conspiracy because he believed he was assisting Na as a 
government agent—a belief Lee contends is substantiated by evidence that, after Lee’s 
plea, Na was arrested with Homeland Security business cards in his possession and 
thereafter began cooperating formally with the United States Government.  The District 
Court denied Lee’s motion.   
II. Standard of Review 
 We review the District Court’s denial of a motion to withdraw a guilty plea for 
abuse of discretion and its findings of fact for clear error.  United States v. Martinez, 785 
F.2d 111, 113 & n.1 (3d Cir. 1986).   
III. Discussion 
 There is no absolute right to withdraw a guilty plea, United States v. Vallejo, 476 
F.2d 667, 669 (3d Cir. 1973), and a defendant faces a “substantial burden” in 
demonstrating that withdrawal should be allowed, United States v. Siddons, 660 F.3d 
699, 703 (3d Cir. 2011).  Federal Rule of Criminal Procedure 11(d)(2)(B) states, “[a] 
defendant may withdraw a plea of guilty . . . after the court accepts the plea, but before it 
imposes sentence if . . . the defendant can show a fair and just reason for requesting the 
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withdrawal.”1  The fair-and-just-reason inquiry focuses on the so-called Jones factors, 
which take into account, “(1) whether the defendant asserts his innocence; (2) the 
strength of the defendant’s reasons for withdrawing the plea; and (3) whether the 
government would be prejudiced by the withdrawal.”  United States v. Jones, 336 F.3d 
245, 252 (3d Cir. 2003).   
 To satisfy the first factor, a defendant must make a credible showing of innocence, 
supported by a factual record.  See id. at 253 (concluding that a “blanket assertion of 
innocence” was insufficient because the defendant “offered no credible facts in support of 
his claim”).  In analyzing the second factor, a defendant must give “strong reasons,” 
United States v. King, 604 F.3d 125, 139 (3d Cir. 2010), to justify withdrawing what we 
have described as a “solemn admission” of guilt, United States v. Isaac, 141 F.3d 477, 
485 (3d Cir. 1998).  A “shift in defense tactics, a change of mind, or the fear of 
punishment are not adequate reasons” to withdraw a guilty plea.  Jones, 336 F.3d at 252 
(quoting United States v. Brown, 250 F.3d 811, 815 (3d Cir. 2001)). 
 On appeal, Lee argues that the District Court erred in analyzing his assertion of 
innocence, the first prong of the Jones test, by failing to consider his good faith and 
                                              
 1 Lee cites a number of cases that stand for the proposition that courts should 
“freely allow[]” guilty plea withdrawals.  Appellant’s Br. 22 (citing United States v. 
Young, 424 F.2d 1276 (3d Cir. 1970); Kadwell v. United States, 315 F.2d 667 (9th Cir. 
1963); Gearhart v. United States, 272 F.2d 499 (D.C. Cir. 1959)).  However, each of 
these cases pre-dates the 1983 Amendments to the Federal Rules, which added the fair-
and-just-reason standard to Rule 32(d), now codified at Rule 11(d).  Since the 
amendment, this Court has applied a more stringent test to adjudicate the merit of 
withdrawal motions.  Martinez, 785 F.2d at 115-16 (rejecting proposition that permission 
to withdraw should be “freely granted” as “contrary to the 1983 amendments to [the 
Rules]”); see also Jones, 336 F.3d at 252 (“The burden of demonstrating a ‘fair and just’ 
reason falls on the defendant, and that burden is substantial.”).   
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entrapment defenses, by making credibility determinations about witnesses at his change 
of plea hearing, and by deciding the ultimate issue of Lee’s culpability.  Lee next argues, 
as to the second prong of the Jones test, that the District Court erred in analyzing the 
strength of his reasons for withdrawing his plea by failing to consider the Government’s 
Brady and Giglio violations, by failing to consider the fact that Na was arrested after 
Lee’s guilty plea, and by refusing to grant defense counsel a continuance that Lee 
contends was necessary to adequately prepare for trial.  We will address each argument 
below.2  
A.  First Jones Factor: Lee’s Innocence 
 Lee argues that the District Court erred in its assessment of his innocence under 
the first Jones factor, faulting the Court for failing to consider, or give proper weight to, 
his good faith and entrapment defenses, and, in so doing, improperly making 
determinations as to the credibility of testimony offered at Lee’s change of plea hearing 
and as to Lee’s ultimate culpability.  We disagree. 
 Lee urges that because Na duped him into believing he was assisting a government 
agent, he lacked the intent necessary to be guilty of conspiracy, and the District Court 
thus was wrong to discard his argument that a good faith defense warranted withdrawal 
of his guilty plea.  The District Court, however, amply considered as part of its analysis 
under the first Jones factor whether Lee lacked the necessary mental state to plead guilty, 
and it rejected Lee’s argument for sound reasons based on the record.  Lee characterizes 
                                              
 2 While Lee mentions the third Jones factor in passing, he does not challenge the 
District Court’s decision on the basis of that factor.     
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this analysis as an improper assessment of the credibility of testimony and of Lee’s 
culpability.  But a defendant must offer more than a “bald assertion of innocence,” United 
States v. Wilson, 429 F.3d 455, 458 (3d Cir. 2005), to merit a withdrawal of a “solemn 
admission” of guilt, Isaac, 141 F.3d at 485, and the application of this standard 
necessitated that the District Court analyze the record to determine if Lee’s assertion of 
innocence was supported by a foundation in the factual record, Gov’t of V.I. v. Berry, 631 
F.2d 214, 220 (3d Cir. 1980) (“[T]he good faith, credibility and weight of a defendant’s 
assertions in support of a motion [to withdraw a guilty plea] are preeminently issues for 
the hearing court to decide.” (quoting United States v. Washington, 341 F.2d 277, 281 (3d 
Cir. 1965));3 see also Martinez, 785 F.2d at 113 n.1 (citing Berry for same proposition).  
If we were to accept Lee’s approach and prohibit district courts from weighing the 
evidence supporting a defendant’s assertion of innocence, “withdrawal would effectively 
be an automatic right [because t]here are few if any criminal cases where [a] defendant 
[could not] devise some theory or story which, if believed by a jury, would result in his 
acquittal.”  Berry, 631 F.2d at 220 (quoting United States v. Barker, 514 F.2d 208, 221 
                                              
 3 Although Berry was decided in 1980, prior to the 1983 Amendments to the 
Federal Rules, it applied Supreme Court case law that imposed a fair-and-just-reason 
standard on withdrawal of guilty pleas.  Berry, 631 F.2d at 219 (“[T]he Supreme Court 
has enunciated the standard that such withdrawal should be permitted ‘if for any reason 
the granting of the privilege seems fair and just.’” (quoting Kercheval v. United States, 
274 U.S. 220, 224 (1927))).  
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(D.C. Cir. 1975)).4  Accordingly, while Lee disagrees with the District Court’s 
disposition under the first Jones factor, we perceive no abuse of discretion. 
 As for Lee’s argument on an entrapment defense, a review of Lee’s motion to 
withdraw reveals that he never raised entrapment as a basis for innocence in that motion, 
and “[i]t is axiomatic that ‘arguments asserted for the first time on appeal are deemed to 
be waived and consequently are not susceptible to review in this Court absent exceptional 
circumstances.’”5  Tri-M Group, LLC v. Sharp, 638 F.3d 406, 416 (3d Cir. 2011) 
(quoting United States v. Petersen, 622 F.3d 196, 202 n.4 (3d Cir. 2010)).  Because Lee 
has failed to proffer a showing of exceptional circumstances, we decline to consider his 
entrapment defense.     
B.  Second Jones Factor: Strength of Lee’s Reasons for Withdrawal 
 Lee’s argument as to the second Jones factor—the strength of his reasons to 
withdraw his plea—are threefold.  None are persuasive. 
 First, Lee insists that the Government failed to disclose material exculpatory 
evidence in violation of Brady v. Maryland, 373 U.S. 83 (1963), and Giglio v. United 
States, 405 U.S. 150 (1972).  In particular, he argues the Government failed to disclose: 
                                              
 4 Moreover, the District Court did not make an ultimate determination about Lee’s 
guilt.  Lee’s motion was predicated on the fact that he had already pleaded guilty to the 
crimes charged in the indictment and had already stated under oath and on the record at 
his plea hearing that he was “in fact guilty to the charges [to] which [he pleaded].”  App. 
266.  The District Court cannot be held accountable for finding guilt where Lee had 
already admitted to as much himself.   
 
 5 The Government contends we apply a plain error standard of review, but the 
cases it cites in support involved counsel’s failure to object to evidentiary issues at trial.  
United States v. Christie, 624 F.3d 558, 567-69 (3d Cir. 2010) (reviewing trial testimony 
to which counsel failed to object for plain error).   
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(1) business cards, an ICE badge, and handcuffs found on Na when Na was arrested, (2) 
Na’s post-arrest statement to police that he tricked Lee into believing he was an ICE 
agent, (3) evidence Na was an informant, and (4) information about Na’s history of 
fraudulent misrepresentations to the Government.  But, once again, Lee’s motion reveals 
that, while he argued new information became available after his guilty plea, he never 
raised Brady or Giglio violations to the District Court.  Accordingly, Lee’s Brady and 
Giglio arguments are waived on appeal.  Tri-M Group, LLC, 638 F.3d at 416. 
 Second, Lee contends that, even if the Government did not violate Brady and 
Giglio, Na was arrested after Lee pleaded guilty, thereby ensuring Lee’s “ability to secure 
Na’s presence at trial.”  Appellant’s Br. 41.  We agree with the District Court that, to the 
extent Lee argues this change in circumstances justifies his change of plea, he has failed 
to proffer a legitimate reason as to why Na would not have been available to testify 
before he was arrested.  Na had met with an investigator and provided documents to aid 
in Lee’s defense prior to Lee’s plea, and Lee was informed at his plea colloquy that he 
would be able to both call witnesses to testify on his behalf and “issue subpoenas or 
compulsory process for witnesses to testify in [his] defense.”  App. 267.  His argument 
that Na’s arrest made him more available as a witness is therefore meritless.  
 Third, Lee argues he was given inadequate time to prepare for trial and that the 
District Court abused its discretion in denying his attorney’s request for a continuance, 
thus rendering his guilty plea involuntary.  Specifically, he points to retaining new 
counsel less than thirty days before trial, and, in that thirty days, he points out, “the 
government . . . provided thirty-eight . . . critical exculpatory email . . . and further failed 
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to provide translations for hundreds of other emails that were in the Korean Language 
and may have been exculpatory.”  Appellant’s Br. 42.  We note, first, that the docket 
reflects that no motion for a continuance was ever filed by Lee’s counsel, much less 
denied.  Instead, Lee’s counsel requested a pre-trial conference to discuss how to handle 
the flood of new documents, but then withdrew that same request the following day.  The 
District Court cannot have erred in denying a request for a continuance that was never 
made.  And because this argument was not presented to the District Court, we deem it 
waived on appeal in any event.  Tri-M Group, LLC, 638 F.3d at 416.  
IV.  Conclusion 
  For the reasons set forth above, the District Court did not abuse its discretion in 
denying Lee’s motion to withdraw his guilty plea, and we will affirm. 
